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STATE INSURANCE STATUTE STRUCK DOWN
FOR INTERFERING WITH FREE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins.
208 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1965)
The Massachusetts legislature enacted a statute which stipulated that
if premiums on a life, disability, or hospital insurance policy are normally
collected by an agent employed by the insurer, the policy could not lapse
or be terminated for failure to pay any premium falling due during a strike
of the insurer's agents.' John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. filed with
the Massachusetts commissioner of insurance a proposed policy endorsement
which was addressed to the problem of policy lapse during an agents' strike,2
but the endorsement was rejected because it provided less protection to policy-
holders than the minimum required by the statute (hereinafter referred to
as section 187F).
1 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175, § 187F (Lawyers Coop. Supp. 1965):
1. No life insurance policy, non-cancellable disability insurance contract,
hospital expense or hospital and surgical expense contract, now or hereafter in
force in the commonwealth, premiums for which are normally collected by in-
surance agents employed by the insurer, shall terminate or lapse by reason of
default in payment of any premium, installment or interest on any policy loan
payable to said insurer during the period that said insurer's agents are on
strike.
2. The insured or premium payer of any policy or contract of insurance
set forth in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to a grace period of thirty-one days
immediately following the authorized termination of such strike, within which
the payment of any premium installment or interest on any policy loan may
be made, during which period of grace the policy or contract of insurance shall
continue in full force and effect.
3. If a claim arises under the policy or contract of insurance during a strike
period as set forth in paragraph 1, or during the grace period as set forth in
paragraph 2, before the overdue premium, or installment or interest on a policy
loan, if any, are paid, the amount of such overdue premium or installment to-
gether with interest not to exceed six per cent per annum and the amount of any
loan with interest due, may be deducted from the amount payable under the
policy or contract in settlement.
2 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 208 NE.2d 516, 518 n.1
(Mass. 1965). The proposed provision stated:
If any premium becomes payable by the stated terms of the policy during the
period of a strike in the state where the owner resides ... and such premium is
not paid when due or by the end of the grace period, if any, expressly stated
in the policy, the policy will be reinstated without evidence of insurability upon
receipt by the Company at its Home Office within 60 days after the premium
due date and during the lifetime of the Insured of the overdue premium.... A
strike of the Company's agents shall not operate to prevent lapse of the policy
if the premium is not paid when due or by the end of the grace period expressly
stated in the policy, if any ....
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Suing for judgment declaring section 187F invalid, Hancock asserted
that the statutory prevention of lapse would cause it sufficient economic
harm to enable its union to coerce concessions it could not get absent the
effect of section 187F, and therefore, section 187F sufficiently upset the
balance of bargaining power between Hancock and its agents to violate the
federal policy of free collective bargaining. The court held section 187F
invalid on the ground that it did interfere with free collective bargaining,
and that it interfered with the right of an employer to protect and continue
his business by hiring replacements for strikers and the right of an employee
to refrain from participating in a strike3
Although the court concluded that section 187F interfered with the
right to hire replacements for strikers and the right of an employee to refrain
from participation in a strike, this conclusion may be dismissed summarily.
Section 187F did not, either expressly or impliedly, prohibit an insurer from
having agents, whether replacements or non-striking regular employees, in
the field. The language of section 187F merely prevents the insurer from
terminating industrial insurance policies during a strike because premiums
were not paid.4
With respect to the court's main holding that section 187F disrupted the
free collective bargaining process, it should be noted that the regulation of
insurance, except for regulation of labor relations, was left to the states by
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.5 Section 187F was not explicitly directed to
labor controversies or collective bargaining. Therefore, although the Labor-
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) 6 is applicable to the insurance
business, it was not clear that the Labor Act applied. Consequently, Hancock
presented a possible conflict between the policy of federal labor-management
relations and the policy underlying state insurance regulations enacted in con-
formity with the Congressional delegation of authority in section 2 of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. In resolving the possible conflict, the policy under-
lying section 187F should have been examined and weighed against the impact
of section 187F on free collective bargaining, for state interests still have a
3 Id. at 525.
4 See note 1, supra.
5 McCarran-Ferguson Act § 2, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1964):
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject
to the laws of the several states which relate to the regulation or taxation of
such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of in-
surance ... unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance....
McCarran-Ferguson Act, § 4, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1014 (1964):
Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to affect in any manner the
application to the business of insurance of the Act of July 5, 1935, as amended,
known as the National Labor Relations Act ....
6 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964). Section 4 of the McCarran-Ferguson




place in labor relations as evidenced by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
over labor disputes. Primary jurisdiction over labor controversies has been
vested in the National Labor Relations Board7 to insure uniformity in ad-
judication of disputes.8 However, exception to the rule of exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the NLRB has been made where one of the parties to a dispute engages
in violent tortious acts, even though the conduct may be enjoinable under
the Taft-Hartley Act.9 Thus, the violent tort cases balanced the interest of
consistent application of labor policy against the state's interest in main-
tenance of domestic peace, and concluded in favor of state interest. o
The opinion in Hancock failed to discuss possible policy reasons for
enactment of section 187F,11 but discussed only the effect of section 187F
on labor relations. Concededly, the analogy between Hancock and the violent
tort cases is weak because the balance in the latter was heavily in favor of
state interest.' 2 However, inquiry into where the balance lay was not fore-
7t Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), held in part that state courts may not exercise juris-
diction over a labor dispute arguably subject to NLRB jurisdiction even where the
NLRB declined to exercise its jurisdiction. Subsequent to the decision in Garmon, § 14(c)
of the Labor-Management Relations Act was enacted, limiting the Garmon decision. Sec-
tion 14(c) enables state courts or agencies to exercise jurisdiction over labor controversies
where the NLRB has declined to exercise its primary jurisdiction because of an insub-
stantial effect of the controversy on interstate commerce. Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act § 701(a), 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U..C. § 164(c) (1964).
8 Garner v. Teamsters Union, sgpra note 7, at 490-91: "A multiplicity of tribunals
and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting ad-
judications as are different rules of substantive law."
9 Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.,
347 U.S. 656 (1954).
10 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, supra note 7, at 247.
11 The court merely stated that "The harm sought to be averted by this exercise of
police power does not clearly appear," and adverted to the absence of statutory history.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., supra note 2 at 525.
12 Potential state and federal substantive policy clash is absent in the violent tort
cases, because the Labor-Management Relations Act clearly prohibits violent intimidation
of persons. Section 8(b) of the act provides in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 7 ... or (B) an employer in the selection of his representatives for
the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances ....
(4) ... to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person ... where an object thereof
is-Eforcing an employer or self employed person to join a labor or employer or-
ganization, forcing any person to cease dealing with another, forcing recognition
of an uncertified union where another union has been recognized, or forcing
work assignment to employees in one bargaining unit instead of those in a
competing bargaining unit.]
Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartey Act) § 8(b), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as
amended 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1964).
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closed merely because the state interest in Hancock was not as com-
pelling. An analysis of the factors which could have prompted the enactment
of section 187F reveals that the state interest in Hancock, compared to its
slight effect on collective bargaining, was sufficient to sustain the section.
Because of the special nature of the debit system of insurance, the
state has an interest in preventing lapse of policies during a strike. The
business is carried on chiefly for the benefit of wage-earning persons, many
of whom cannot afford to carry ordinary insurance policies or who cannot
adapt their budgets to meet the payments due at annual, semiannual, or
quarterly intervals. Therefore, insurance is usually sold on the basis of
weekly or monthly cost instead of by face amount.'3 Premiums are normally
paid to a debit agent who calls on the insured at weekly or monthly intervals.
Commissions on premiums collected is the principal item of an agent's
compensation.14
Further, industrial insurance has been criticized because of its high
lapse rate with consequent loss or added cost to policyholders. 15 Statistics
cited in the Hancock opinion indicate that more than eighty per cent of
debit policy premiums are collected by agents.' 6 It seems that a strike's
interruption of an agent's periodic call at the policyholder's home, combined
with his reliance on the agent's call, would contribute considerably to lapse
by default in payment of premiums. Loss of premiums paid by and loss of
insurance protection for policyholders resulting from an agents' strike is a
legitimate legislative concern in regulating the insurance business.
What losses will the insurance companies suffer if they must provide
continued insurance protection during a strike? The Massachusetts court
reasoned that section 187F would deprive the insurance company of current
income and could require liquidation of long term investments at a loss.
Additionally, many for whom no claims arose during a strike might choose
not to pay their arrears and drop their policies when the premium moratorium
was lifted.17 Others, who had claims arise during the moratorium, wisely would
13 Maclean, Life Insurance, 406-07 (9th ed. 1962).
34 Additional factors in the agent compensation formula are new business written by
the agent and success of the agent in conserving the business under his care. That portion
of the agent's compensation which depends on his success in conserving the business under
his care is computed with reference to the lapse rate of an individual agent's business
compared with the lapse rate of the whole company. Id. at 418.
'5 Id. at 412. However, although Maclean states that the percentage of the total
premiums paid on all terminated industrial life policies for which no nonforfeiture or cash
benefit is received is less than one per cent, his statistics assume continued agent activity.
Ibid.
Twenty-six weeks of premium payment prerequisite to nonforfeiture benefit is cited
for policies of the larger companies. Cash surrender values are provided for industrial
life policies which have been in force for three to five years. Id. at 415.
16 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., supra note 2, at 519
n.4.
17 See text accompanying note 13 supra. One of the primary reasons for selling in-
dustrial insurance on the basis of weekly or monthly cost is that many policyholders
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choose to pay their arrears and collect on their policies.18 Thus, the morato-
rium in effect would require the insurance company to assume risks of all
who were policyholders at the commencement of a strike, yet be compensated
for the assumption of risk only by those who chose to continue their policies
when the moratorium was lifted. Further, the court reasoned, the losses just
mentioned are contrary to the actuarial basis on which the insurance business
is founded, since strikes are not events which can be reasonably predicted
by the insurance company. Where, as here, the insurance company cannot
enforce its contract rights, the union has an economic force on its side which
it would not have in the absence of section 187F.19
Contrary to the court's reasoning, rate adjustments could be made to
cover losses from the insurer's inability to enforce its contract rights. The
insurer has claim experience for various times of year, and knows when labor
contracts come up for consideration. Strike duration and frequency are the
only unknowns in the statistical equation with which the insurer must work. 0
It seems that this deficiency in experience can be compensated for, however.
Preliminary assessment of the probability of strike occurrence and of strike
duration could be based on past bargaining experience and the insurer's
knowledge of the union's economic strength. As experience accumulated, the
insurer could adjust rates to recoup losses arising from erroneous judgment.
Over a period of years, the rate adjustment for strike losses would stabilize
to the point where strike losses caused by operation of section 187F could be
accurately estimated. Further, it seems probable that most of the persons who
were covered by insurance during a strike but failed to pay their arrears when
the strike terminated would start new policies when the agents again became
active in the field. These persons, those whose inaction caused loss to the
insurer, would be the very people who would repay that loss through adjusted
premiums.
The examination above indicates that the economic impact on the insurer
of section 187F was small. What, then, is the requisite impact on collective
bargaining to invalidate a state act? The Massachusetts court relied on
General Electric Co. v. Callahan2 l to establish the federal policy and scope of
free collective bargaining, and by analogy concluded that the economic
interference of section 187F with free collective bargaining was sufficient to
invalidate it. Callahan concluded that participation in hearings before a state
board which had no direct coercive power, but which issued a report assessing
cannot adapt their budgets to meet the payments due at longer intervals. If a strike
lasted very long, it is unlikely that policyholders could pay their arrears if they wanted to.
18 See the text of § 187F, supra note 1. Subsection 3 provides that payment of back
premiums may be deducted from a claim settlement.
19 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., supra note 2, at 524-25.
20 There have been three strikes in the insurance industry in Massachusetts since
1951. Id. at 525 n.5. This strike experience of companies other than Hancock may not, in
itself, be sufficient experience on which to base calculations for rate adjustments, but it is
a starting point.
21 294 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1961).
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blame for a labor dispute, would tend to indirectly coerce concessions by
parties to the dispute.2 2 The Callahan court reasoned that mere participation
in a state board mediation hearing would tend to solidify positions taken at
the bargaining table, making later flexibility difficult, and publication of
the report assessing blame for the dispute could put public opinion behind
one party, making the other party's bargaining position more precarious.
Callahan seems to establish that nominal interference with the bargaining
process by state action renders the state action invalid. However, the Hancock
court overlooked an important distinction between Callahan and Hancock.
Callahan did not involve a recognized state interest, 2 whereas Hancock
involved a congressionally recognized state interest in insurance regulation.
Teamsters Union v. Oliver,24 in a situation parallel to that in Hancock,
seemed to limit consideration of state interest to situations where state
interest is on the order of that in the violent tort cases. However, close
examination reveals that Oliver did not foreclose balancing state and federal
interests in less compelling situations. Oliver dealt with the application of
Ohio's anti-trust laws to a provision contained in a collective bargaining
agreement between the Teamsters Union and a group of interstate carriers.
Industry practice was for carriers to lease part of their fleets from individual
owners, paying the owners to drive their own trucks for the carrier under
the provisions of the labor contract with the Teamsters Union, and contracting
for use of the trucks under a separate agreement with the owners. Fearing
that the lease device could be used by the carriers to effectively avoid the
union wage scale by contracting for use of the leased trucks at a loss to the
owner-driver, which loss would have to be covered out of the owner-driver's
wages, the union obtained a clause in their contract with the carriers which
provided a minimum truck rental for owner-drivers. The clause was nar-
rowly drawn to cover only the situation described, and the rental fixed
represented only the actual cost of operating the equipment.2 5 The Ohio
courts attempted to invalidate the clause as an unlawful restraint on com-
petition between truck lessors, but were reversed by the Supreme Court
because the clause was related to wages, and hence a proper term of collective
bargaining. Implicit in the Court's exploration of the scope of the contract
clause and its emphasis on its specificity2 6 is a recognition of Ohio's interest
in preventing restraints on competition, negating the proposition that Oliver
limits consideration of state interest to the violent tort cases.
Close examination revealed that Ohio's action was not to invalidate
restraints on price competition, but to support a situation where bargaining
power of a carrier superior to that of a one truck owner could be used to
22 Id. at 67.
23 Callahan, in contrast to Hancock involved a labor dispute. However, absent
violent tortious acts, a state has no jurisdiction over labor disputes. See text accompanying
note 7, supra.
24 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
25 Id. at 293-94.
26 Ibid.
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depress wages of drivers of carrier owned trucks by forcing them to meet the
effective wage of owner-drivers or go elsewhere for work. One of the policies
underlying the statutory right of collective bargaining is preclusion of wage
depression caused by inequalities in bargaining power between an employer
and individual employees. On balance, therefore, the Ohio action had a
direct impact on federal labor policy. In Hancock, however, the effect of the
questioned state action on federal labor policy is only nominal.
In conclusion, the opinion and holding in Hancock foreclosed considera-
tion of state policy underlying a statutory provision where the state statute
may have incidentally affected a bargaining relationship. Federal court
precedent did not demand the result reached by the Massachusetts court.
In another situation with similar degrees of state and federal policy interest,
state interests should fare better than they did in Hancock.
